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Under normal circumstances, different inner- and outer-body sources are integrated to
form coherent and accurate mental experiences of the state of the body, leading to the
phenomenon of corporeal awareness. How these processes are affected by changes in
inner and outer inputs to the body remains unclear. Here, we aim to present empirical
evidence in which people with a massive sensory and motor disconnection may continue
to experience feelings of general body state awareness without complete control of their
inner and outer states. In these clinical populations, the activity of the neural structures
subserving inner and outer body processing can be manipulated and tuned by means
of body illusions that are usually based on multisensory stimulation. We suggest that
a multisensory therapeutic approach could be adopted in the context of therapies for
patients suffering from deafferentation and deefferentation. In this way, these individuals
could regain a more complete feeling and control of the sensations they experience,
which vary widely depending on their neurological condition.
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Normally, we have a sense of our own body, and our corporeal awareness is related to the
integration of information from both outside and inside the body. Structural alterations and
systematic misperceptions of body awareness are due to changes relative to inner and outer
experiences during pathological and physiological conditions. In this article, we discuss the
conscious body-self phenomenon from a neurological perspective. Our aim is to clarify the degree
of body/brain continuity required to support global corporeal awareness in patients with some
form of detachment, as seen in locked-in syndrome (LIS) or spinal cord injury (SCI). Finally, we
highlight the mutual interplay of multisensory integration across exteroceptive and interoceptive
domains with regards to modulating bodily awareness disorders and increasing the coherence of
sensory experiences from one’s own body.
Inner and Outer Sources of the Body State
Intuitively, the interoceptive system is the first source that contributes to body consciousness by
receiving signals from the internal milieu and relative to homeostatic status. This inner source may
reflect our most ‘‘primitive’’ feelings about the needs of the ‘‘soma’’, which are structured within
composite and dynamic maps that are updated moment to moment depending on changes in the
inner body (Craig, 2003; Seth et al., 2012). In particular, at the brain stem level, autoregulatory
centers (such as the nucleus of the solitary tract, the periaqueductal gray, the parabrachial
nucleus, the postrema area, and the hypothalamus; (Damasio, 1993) send signals related
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to visceral sensations to the insular cortex and interoceptive
centers (Craig, 2009). These inputs mediate the signals of
subjective evaluation of the internal bodily state within the
closely interconnected orbitofrontal cortices (Devue et al., 2007).
The momentary entity of the ‘‘physical self ’’ (the sense of the
physiological condition of the body; (Craig, 2002), ‘‘sentient
self ’’ (the subjective awareness of oneself as a feeling entity;
(Craig, 2009), ‘‘neural self ’’ (the primordial representations of
the individual’s body; (Damasio, 1993), and the ‘‘behavioral
agent’’ (affectivemotivations of the volitional agent; (Craig, 2002)
emerge in these cortices and attend to inner bodily feelings
(Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2009) and homeostatic states (Craig,
2003; Seth et al., 2012). Along with the vestibular system, the
proprioceptive system completes the internal picture of body
consciousness via the perception of physical sensations related
to position and movement.
The outer source, the second source of corporeal awareness,
may rely on the flow of co-perceived multisensory information
(in this case, visual, somatosensory and, at least in part,
proprioceptive signals) that define the physiological condition
of the external body (Aglioti and Pazzaglia, 2010, 2011;
Blanke, 2012; Serino et al., 2013). Accordingly, body-state
awareness should be related to the brain areas that receive
sensory information about the body and, ultimately, initiate
motor reactions. The most likely candidates are the posterior
somatosensory cortex, the left temporoparietal cortex and, to a
lesser extent, the occipitotemporal cortex and the motor cortex,
which guides somatic motor activity (Blanke, 2012). This outer
source is known to predict that major alterations in corporeal
awareness depend on changes relative to efferent (motor)
and afferent (sensory) experiences. These modifications can be
measured during certain experimental conditions (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Blanke and Metzinger,
2009), as well as in patients with a number of neurological and
psychiatric diseases and disorders (Bermudez, 1998; Gallagher,
2005). Neuroscientists have investigated the central mechanisms
of corporeal awareness by using body surrogates in virtual reality
and robotics technologies (Slater et al., 2010; Maselli and Slater,
2013) and providing subjects with ambiguous multisensory
information about body reduplication (Ehrsson, 2007). These
studies, inspired by the autoscopic phenomena investigated in
clinical populations (Devinsky et al., 1989; Blanke et al., 2004;
Bolognini et al., 2011), suggest that the adult human brain
is equipped with neural systems in which the point of view
for the conscious awareness of the body can be manipulated.
This phenomenon is generally referred to as an out-of-body
experience (Muldoon and Carrington, 1929; Ehrsson, 2007).
During autoscopic and heautoscopy hallucinations, patients see
a duplication of their body in an extracorporeal position (see
Figure 1). Although the precise origin of out-of-body experiences
has not yet been identified, it has been proposed that the feeling
of being outside the real body can be due to a disintegration of
the inner signals in temporo-parietal-insular brain and a failure
to produce coherent, central integration bodily signals (Blanke
and Mohr, 2005). Under this abnormal multisensory interplay,
the consequence is a complex disturbance of perception and
conception of corporeal perspective and physical location.
The illusory alterations of awareness of the body-self
can be induced experimentally during the so-called ‘‘rubber
hand illusion’’ (RHI), where a dummy hand is used to
create a multisensory conflict (Serino et al., 2013). In this
paradigm, the synchronous stroking of an observed fake hand
and one’s own hidden hand leads to an illusory sensation
of touching one’s own hand (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998).
This multisensory manipulation induces changes not only
in one’s own touch perception, but also in terms of inner
perceptions such as skin temperature (Salomon et al., 2013),
the heartbeat (Suzuki et al., 2013), and pain sensations (Hansel
et al., 2011). Phenomenologically, it is possible to induce
the conscious experience of self-identification, self-location
and a first-person perspective of inner and outer bodily
signals through an enhanced multisensory experience (Blanke,
2012).
Corporeal State Awareness in an
Insentient and Unmoving Physical Body
This perspective article will consider some of the scientific
work that has been focused on patients with both massive
somatic deafferentation and motor deefferentation of the body
in order to investigate pathological perspectives of corporeal
state awareness. We chose to focus on disturbed outer and
inner body processes in SCI in order to investigate how they
are manifest in terms of general awareness of the body. In
patients with SCI, sensorimotor traffic between the body and
the brain is typically interrupted. This disconnection leads to
no sensation in, or voluntary movement of, either the lower
body or the entire body. The neurological status, and the
level and severity of damage to the spinal cord, determines
the number of organs and segments of both the inner and
outer body that are ‘‘isolated’’ from the brain and the various
degrees of sensory-motor loss (Hohmann, 1966; Montoya and
Schandry, 1994). Following SCI, spinal somatic visceral pathways
are partially or totally disrupted, and internal perception is
distorted (Salvioli et al., 2012). Such alterations to visceral
perception include gastrointestinal (Miller and Fenzl, 1981) and
intestinal (Salvioli et al., 2012) malfunctions, reduced cardiac
awareness (Montoya and Schandry, 1994) and sensations of
systematic bladder-filling (Ersoz and Akyuz, 2004). Individuals
with an SCI may have difficulty in identifying primitive bodily
sensations, e.g., hunger and thirst (Lenggenhager et al., 2012),
presumably due to disturbances in somato-visceral afferent
feedback (Haas and Geng, 2008). Unfortunately, after injury,
many of the inner and outer sensations of the body present
as pain. Pain is something that, when felt in an insentient
and unmoving body part, promotes one of the most basic
sensory experiences of body awareness. As one patient with
SCI explained: ‘‘The pain, is the connection with the body—the
pain is my friend’’ (Cole, 2004). Here, pain serves as a
physical entity that allows for the possible feeling of the
entire physical body rather than nothing and numbness (Cole,
2004).
Moreover, sensory loss in parts of the outer body modulates
an individual’s corporeal awareness of how those body parts
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FIGURE 1 | Summary of the brain structures that process bodily
signals. This figure describes the neural network related to the inner and
outer body states that can be manipulated and tuned by different factors:
(A) Depiction of the phenomenology of out-of-body experiences, in
particular the autoscopic experience of seeing a double-self without the
experience of leaving one’s own body. (B) The interoceptive stimuli that
have been shown to activate the neural structures subserving inner body
processing: the heartbeat and respiratory perception/detection and the
distension of the bladder and stomach. The central brain illustration depicts
the critical brain areas related to the inner (black) and outer (white) body
signals, which are alluded to in these paradigms; pSTG = posterior superior
temporal gyrus, TPJ = right temporoparietal junction, S1 = primary
somatosensory cortex, mPMC = medial premotor cortex, insula,
mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex.
‘‘feel’’. When somatic information throughout the body is
not complete, individuals, such as patients with SCI, tend to
touch themselves regularly to reassure themselves that they do
indeed have a body and that they actually exist (Cole, 2004;
Lenggenhager et al., 2012). Therefore, in the absence of vision, a
complete inability to utilize proprioceptive information impedes
proper postural control and spatial perception of body position,
which are necessary for immediate sense of self-attribution
(Gallagher, 2000; Galli and Pazzaglia, 2015). In addition to the
loss of sensation and the sense of joint position, patients with SCI
tend to experience a relevant loss of limb movement. Moreover,
these patients tend to have a disruption in the intentional control
of movement below the injury level. A real sense of acting in/on
the world is crucial to expressing physical self-awareness. The
absence, and sometimes altered presence, of relevant sensory
signals, and a profound alteration of movement have relevant
effects on the automaticity of body awareness (Cole, 2004). The
state of the body is, however, not completely passive, and new and
different relations with one’s own body in terms of movement
can be actively learned (Pazzaglia et al., 2013). Additionally,
the absence of any perception seems to shift the underlying
mechanisms of corporeal awareness to the preserved visual and
vestibular systems. While this representation in individuals with
SCI is abnormal for the specific body region, it does not disappear
for the body as a coherent whole (Fuentes et al., 2013). Even
in the most extreme case of brain-body disconnection, such as
LIS, the brain maintains a relatively persistent representation of
the body (Nizzi et al., 2012). Acute ventral pontine lesions are
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the most common cause of the quadriplegia that characterizes
LIS, with patients exhibiting total large-fiber deafferentation and
deefferentation below the neck. These individuals are classically
described as being ‘‘trapped’’ within their paralyzed bodies
(Bauer et al., 1979; Inci and Ozgen, 2003; Laureys et al.,
2005). Obviously, sensations from the body constitute a major
element of the experience of awareness. However, despite the
fact that global paralysis clearly restricts these patients’ capacity
to feel and move their body, their internal representation is
not disembodied (Kyselo and Di Paolo, 2013). In cases of
LIS, the global corporeal awareness can be linked to minimal
eye movements, which are capable of actively engaging the
whole body (Nizzi et al., 2012). Visual image of the body can
continuously update insentient body segments (Gallagher and
Cole, 1995). Therefore, visual experience is dominant (Pazzaglia,
2015) and independent of the loss of sensory and motor
inputs/outputs. Consequently, it is not surprising that images
can elicit an immediate ‘‘reconnect’’ of body-self awareness.
As one patient with an upper cervical injury and a complete
loss of all movements and sensations of body said: ‘‘I still
view my body as whole; it’s just motionless. I’m not a head
on a bag of potatoes. I still know it is there. I like to see
it. It is still me and I am still it. Totally. I always say at
the end of the day that I am motionless but I am still me,
body and all’’ (Cole, 2004). In this patient and others, visual
monitoring and visual memory keep body awareness intact. The
brain can construct a sense of wholeness and configuration
based on memorized body data established during years of
life. This type of awareness may reflect an innate configuration
within certain brain regions that is organized in such a way
that the body is represented as a coherent whole, rather than
separately for each body part. Despite the massive sensory and
motor loss, the phantom limb and RHI experiences in SCI
(Burke and Woodward, 1976; Lenggenhager et al., 2012) and LIS
(Tanaka et al., 2008) patients support the idea that the complete
body image is maintained despite alterations in neurological
function. It is possible that from the adult brain, the idea of
a body that is brutally interrupted does not exist, and visual
monitoring may be helping patients to recreate a coherent
body image.
Multisensory Interaction Generates a New,
More Precise, Definition of the Body in
Clinical Populations Suffering from
Deafferentation
Together, clinical examples provide some empirical support
for the notion that the state of the body is, in fact, a
synthesis of multiple and complex states, and that offline
and online body representations may be invoked to obtain a
coherent and accurate mental experience of corporal awareness.
Consequently, a lack of any movement and sensation in
these patients probably has more relevance for the control
of inner and outer states than it does for general awareness
of the body-self. It remains unclear whether, in the absence
of new sensory inputs: (i) it is possible to update one’s own
body representation (Serino et al., 2013); and (ii) the body,
like the brain, is able to adapt (Kyselo, 2014). However,
the sensorial and motor loss of a limb and, consequently,
of functionality, can result in bodily changes that adjust
what is known as the internal body map (Pazzaglia et al.,
2013).
Interestingly, in patients with tetraplegia, when the
phenomenological experience of the body illusion is induced
experimentally during the RHI, it enhances bodily feelings
related to deafferented body parts. During multisensory
conflict, these patients unexpectedly attribute vivid tactile
and proprioceptive sensations to completely numb fingers
(Lenggenhager et al., 2013). Delivering tactile stimuli to the
non-deafferented fingers can increase the sense of having a
complete physical body, and thus hints at the plastic remapping
of numb finger representations. In a similar vein, stroking the
face of deafferented patients evokes the illusory perception of
one’s own numb hand, suggesting a possible remapping of hand-
face representations (Tidoni et al., 2014). The ‘‘mislocalization’’
of light touch to the numb hand suggests a strong capture of
global body-self awareness. This increased malleability of the
sense of one’s body results from both dampened interoceptive
perception and afferent multisensory signals that are remapped
or augmented during multisensory illusory interplay. Sensation
loss can re-emerge during stimulation, and the perceived illusory
body may reflect an isomorphic corporal representation to the
innate body. It is worth noting that patients with SCI do have
residual capacity in some internal and external body parts. After
injury, spared axons sprout and make new connections and a
small portion of the spinal cord remains intact, even in cases of
severe and complete spinal cord lesions(Anderson et al., 2004;
Guest et al., 2005). Thus, small sensory fibers could provide
reduced sensations in insentient body regions (Cariga et al.,
2002).
Although the sensations are altered and often discontinuous,
the operations of the actual body are nevertheless mapped in
the body’s neural structures (Fuentes et al., 2013; Pazzaglia
et al., 2013). The mismatch between the body viewed and not
felt, and the proprioceptive and interoceptive information of
limited body parts, nonetheless provides a partial signal to the
relevant brain area (Lenggenhager et al., 2013; Tidoni et al.,
2014). This allows a feeling of awareness of the body-self despite
the radical bodily change. During multisensory stimulation,
enhanced signals in the neural ‘‘body-sensing’’ region of what
one’s body felt like prior to injury re-emerge in terms of what
one’s actual body feels like following injury (Lenggenhager
et al., 2013; Pazzaglia et al., 2013). This recreates reliable and
coherent bodily awareness. Multisensory integration provides
a significant opportunity to promote neural plasticity, which
could optimize feelings that are linked to corporeal awareness.
Patients with chronic conditions like tetraplegia or LIS may
ultimately profit from multisensory therapy augmented by
artificial bodies. Accordingly, it is possible to induce dynamic
and capable manipulations of body awareness by extending
perceptual sensations from sentient regions to numb body
parts using surrogate body or salient extracorporeal devices
that patients can move and control as if they were their own
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(Pazzaglia, 2015). This could potentially provide patients with
not only the ability to experience self-enhanced sensations, but
to also be able to once again feel inner, insentient, and extending
body parts as their own. The confluence of the multimodal
approach and new technologies (e.g., body interfaces) used to
replace absent movements and sensations could, in the near
future, improve the embodiment of the body regions that patients
are unaware of.
Anticipatory Coding of Body Awareness
Based on the Interaction of Inner and
Outer Signals
If bodily self-consciousness depends on how the brain
dynamically processes multisensory bodily signals (Blanke,
2012), then different body states may also be induced by
manipulating internal signal processing (Seth, 2013). These
hypotheses find strong support in, for example, cardio-visual
experiments in which heartbeat-visual synchronization, which
is similar to the more well-known visuo-tactile synchronization
performed during the RHI, modulates bodily self-consciousness
and tactile perception (Tsakiris et al., 2011; Aspell et al., 2013;
Suzuki et al., 2013).
Moreover, visuo-respiratory stimulations modulate the
feeling that the motor act of breathing is associated with the
virtual body. During synchronous stimulation in the RHI,
subjects perceive a change in breathing location; in other words,
they ‘‘locate their breathing’’ at a point closest to the virtual
body (Adler et al., 2014). These data suggest that interoceptive
awareness seems to be modulated in multisensory contexts.
Yet, visual capture not only modulates interoceptive
awareness under conditions of multisensory integration,
but also has an impact on shared representations in the motor
domain (Pazzaglia, 2013). For example, compared to poor
heartbeat perceivers, good perceivers are more inclined to the
automatic imitation of the movements of others (Ainley et al.,
2014).
In view of this, a fundamental, but far less addressed,
issue concerns the predictive control of interoception, in
which the brain tries to minimize the discrepancy between
states of subjective feeling and the effect predicted for the
interoceptive state of the body (Seth et al., 2012; Seth, 2013).
For example, if a subject’s sensitivity to breathing is altered,
the presentation of a periodic external stimulus (e.g., tones or
lights) can lead to them synchronizing their own breathing with
the presented stimulus. This technique would allow patients
to compensate for distorted perceptions by capturing real
respiratory cues, thereby allowing for the correct awareness
of the breathing activity. More specifically, a subject would
be required to use an anticipatory code of the perceived
outcome to intentionally select their breathing rate rather than
merely feeling it. This predictive coding allows patients to
congruently adapt their inner bodily signals to their outer
ones. In other words, interoception sensitivity is controlled by
anticipatory effects.
Predictions about expected and unexpected future
interceptive perceptions inform the body of corresponding
FIGURE 2 | This figure represents how different clinical disorders
influence inner bodily self-consciousness in terms of hypo-, normal or
hyper-interoceptive sensitivity, specifically related to the heart,
stomach and intestines.
inner malfunctions. The analysis of how inner and outer sources
contribute to the perspective coding of the body in clinical
patients remains a fundamental topic for future research.
Concluding Remarks
According to the laws of multimodal contingencies and the
active engagement of the conscious feedback generated by the
interoceptive state, the cortical systems devoted to bodily self-
consciousness seem to be susceptible to adjustment.
Therefore, multimodal augmented training can reveal benefits
not only in terms of outer signals, such as motor functions,
but also with respect to inner signals, as documented in
experimental conditions (Tsakiris et al., 2011; Aspell et al.,
2013; Suzuki et al., 2013; Adler et al., 2014), and clinical
conditions in relation to, for example, the reduction of
neuropathic pain (Villiger et al., 2013a,b). Although neuroscience
studies referring to the processing of the body’s outer signals
seem to predominate, the inner body is a central aspect
of awareness of the body-self. However, what is needed
is a more precise definition of the different interoceptive
variables that influence the modulation of the body state
and induce changes based on a multisensory approach. This
distinction is important with respect to considerations related
to etiology, research and, crucially, the development of new
rehabilitative treatment models with respect to different clinical
deficits and diseases. Alterations of interoceptive awareness are
present in many psychological clinical states (see Figure 2).
For example, anxiety is associated with a high interoceptive
accuracy level (Domschke et al., 2010), while depression
(Mussgay et al., 1999; Dunn et al., 2007), eating disorders,
(Pollatos et al., 2008; Paulus and Stein, 2010; Klabunde et al.,
2013), alexithymia (Kano et al., 2007; Herbert et al., 2011),
and aging (Khalsa et al., 2009) are related to a diminished
interoceptive ability. However, new therapeutic clinical strategies
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linked to interoceptive states remain a challenge. We argue
that further focus on the plasticity of the neural structures
assigned to inner body processing can help to formulate
a novel concept of body-state awareness and add to both
fundamental processes and themultisensory side of rehabilitative
treatments.
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